In this article, I firstly offer a synthesis of a brief set of analytical elements of the theory of democracy and federalism established in the recent debate which identify a number of flaws in the normative and institutional bases of plurinational democracies. It is necessary to overcome these flaws in order to achieve a true political and constitutional recognition and accommodation of the national pluralism of this kind of liberal democracies (section 1). Secondly, we will focus on the Spanish case of the "Estado de las Autonomías" taking into account the recent reform of the Catalan constitutional law (Estatut d'autonomia 2006) (section 2). A final section makes a number of concluding remarks relating the previously highlighted elements of the theory of democracy and federalism with the analysis of the Catalan case (section 3).
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After the irruption of recent phenomena such as globalization and national pluralism movements, the democratic debate of recent years has revealed the need for more plural responses than those provided by traditional forms of political liberalism and federalism in plurinational societies. Political ideas associated with some liberal revolutions spoke the legitimising language of a 'nation of citizens', usually understood in nationally homogeneous terms, and that of constitutional rights, institutions and decision-making processes. This national homogeneity is something that the empirical evidence of liberal democracies constantly denies in many cases. Phenomena such as the treatment that liberal democracies dispense to indigenous peoples (America, Australia), minority nations (Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country, Catalonia, etc), transnational immigrant peoples have introduced a 'new agenda' of issues -basically, the rights, recognition and political accommodation of permanent national minorities-which have been barely or poorly addressed (or not addressed at all) by classic theories of democracy and federalism. These phenomena have revealed a dark side to these theories in terms of the way that they have usually interpreted and implemented values such as individual dignity, liberty, equality or pluralism when they attempt to tackle political diversity. We will focus here on the case of national pluralism in liberal democracies. In general terms, this dark side refers to the interrelationship between monism and stateism which runs through traditional concepts such as individualism, universalism and through institutional forms of constitutionalism. Monism, said Berlin, is at the root of all extremism (even, we might add, in liberal democracies). 1 At the beginning of 21 st Century, liberal democracies require a more plural and nuanced approach to contexts of national pluralism.
In this article, I firstly offer a synthesis of a brief set of analytical elements of the theory of democracy and federalism established in the recent debate which identify a number of flaws in the normative and institutional bases of plurinational democracies. It is necessary to overcome these flaws in order to achieve a true political and constitutional recognition and accommodation of the national pluralism of this kind of liberal democracies (section 1). Secondly, we will focus on the Spanish case of the "Estado de las Autonomías" taking into account the recent reform of the Catalan constitutional law (Estatut d'autonomia 2006) (section 2). A final section makes a number of concluding remarks relating the previously highlighted elements of the theory of democracy and federalism with the analysis of the Catalan case (section 3).
1. Liberal democracies and federalism in plurinational societies: 14 analytical and normative elements.
Following the intense scholarly analysis and subsequent discussion on liberal democracy and cultural and national pluralism that has taken place over the last fifteen years, at the very least it could be said that traditional democratic liberalism is not very well equipped to deal fairly with national diversity at the beginning of the 21 st century.
Democratic liberalism has been the most emancipating current of political thought in modern times. Its main values and organizational principles represent today a sort of meta-value set of legitimated political references for many societies in the world. At the same time, however, we know that its intellectual foundations were established for much simpler societies in national and cultural terms than present-day Western societies. On the other hand, traditional democratic liberalism has usually encouraged cultural and national homogenization through nation-building and state-building processes that in many empirical cases have treated minority nations unjustly, a practice which is far removed from its own legitimising values. Broadly speaking, the inability of traditional democratic liberalism to manage and accommodate national pluralism is related to its biased notions of individualism, universalism and "stateism". This lack of normative accuracy is present in the hard core concepts and values of traditional liberalism, such as, the "monist" (not pluralist) concept of demos adopted in its conception of democracy, an inherent "stateist" perspective which is reluctant to recognise national minorities that do not fit in with the national and cultural characteristics of the national majority, a biased notion of the "universal values"
defended that in practice has assumed the national "particularities" of majorities marginalising or even refused to allow other particular national and cultural values equal status, etc. These biased conceptual and normative perspectives have also influenced the institutions and rules of decision-making of liberal democracies, such as the dominant perspective adopted in liberal-democratic federal systems.
What follows is a summary of fourteen analytical and normative critical elements of traditional democratic liberalism and federalism based on my previous work, as well as on the analysis of scholars who have dealt with this subject in the last fifteen years (Taylor, Walzer, Parekh, Tully, Kymlicka, Norman, Gagnon, McGarry, etc 2) Nowadays it also seems to be generally accepted that the sphere of "national and cultural" justice is different from the sphere of "social justice". 3) The politics of recognition of different national and cultural differences is part of the struggle for human dignity (Human Development Report, United Nations 5) Plurinational democracies are political collectivities containing two or more internal nations that aspire to be recognized and accommodated politically as such within political and constitutional rules. They, therefore, are not uninational realities with "regional" subunits that belong to a single national demos. They are "different societies" (in the sense that they display distinctive features and express a desire to be distinguished from other societies). It is more correct here to speak of a plurality of demoi than of a single demos (although the latter may describe itself internally as "plural"). The general challenge of plurinational democracies is one polity, several demoi. However, while theories of democracy have usually failed to address or respond to the question of who should constitute the demos of a democracy, theories of justice do not usually address or respond regarding which collectivity "basic justice" should apply to. In both cases, the two concepts are usually uncritically defined in advance in relation to the state (regardless, moreover, of the historical process through which this has been formed). In the majority of theories of liberal justice (Rawls) it is understood that the citizens are united through a common acceptance of a series of "principles of justice", and not through issues of national, cultural or historical identity. This is somewhat naïve in the theoretical sphere of democracies and biased in their practical sphere 7 . This conveniently avoids the need to address, analytically and normatively, the contraposition between the national collectivities of plurinational democracies in terms of a contrast between internally homogeneous blocks. Individual and collective "identities", furthermore, do not constitute a fixed reality either. They construct themselves and change over time 9 . Those democracies which display internal national pluralism usually display distinct simultaneous processes of nation-building. These processes will, at least partly, be of an agonistic nature.
This does not appear to be surmountable by referring to a form of political liberalism based on the "aggregation of interests" or on attempted processes of "rational consensus". Moreover, the fact that two societies share the same values is not particularly informative regarding their willingness to live together (practical agreements which seek to achieve peaceful coexistence) which depend on historical and specific political conditions 11 .
8) Broadly speaking, traditional theories of democracy display a stateist bias, which is favourable to majorities, in relation to: 1) the conceptions of the kinds of individualism, pluralism and universalism that they defend; and 2) the use of legitimizing notions usually of a monist (not pluralist) nature, such as "equality of citizenship", "national sovereignty" or "popular sovereignty". The advisability of considering national pluralism not only as a political fact which has to be managed but as a specific type of normative pluralism that democratic systems must recognize, protect and facilitate 12 .
9) The criticism of individualistic "atomism" and the "subject who chooses" of traditional political liberalism underlines the often flawed approach of traditional liberal-democratic theories to issues of a national and cultural nature. The idea that human beings are autonomous individuals that choose their (national, ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc) identities is to a large extent another myth of traditional liberalism. In other words, this identities are usually not chosen. In reality, they are the foundations on which one's choices are based (political, social and cultural contexts in which individuals socialize, and are usually the result of processes that include historical events of both a peaceful and violent nature -wars of annexation, territorial conquests, etc). These processes are often at the root of present-day struggles for the recognition and accommodation of minority nations 13 .
10) The establishment of constitutional rules in liberal democracies is preceded by a self-awarded collective right: the right to self-government for the state collective, regardless, once again, of the (sometimes coercive) historical process which has created the state itself. This is a right that democracies usually deny internal national collectives of the state polity. The issue of borders has rarely been considered by theories of democracy and federalism. A number of minorities currently question the legitimacy of the state's monopoly of the right to collective self-government and defend their own "right to decide" 14 .
11) The classic liberal-democratic institutional "solutions" to achieve recognition and political accommodation in nationally diverse democracies are federalism, devolution processes, consotionalism and secession Questions regarding institutional issues in plurinational contexts appear to require solutions that are "open" to evolution over time. Regarding federalism, it is important to establish the motives and objectives on which a federalization process is based. These motives and objectives are unlikely to coincide in the case of uninational and plurinational polities. Federated units of a national nature often coexist in a plurinational federation with others of a regional (of the majority nation) nature.
This represents a challenge for the institutional process of federalization in both the potentially asymmetrical level of self-government and the "shared government" of the federation 15 .
12) In theories of federalism, moreover, there is a clear contrast between those that situate the normative centre of gravity in the "union" that emerges from the federal agreement, and those that situate it with the parties that obtain the agreement. Broadly speaking, this is the contrast between the approaches of J.
Madison and J. Althusius, respectively) which are more closely linked with what we might call the spirit of confederations and consotional federalism 16 . One of the aims of the "federal agreement" would, in this case, be the preservation of the identities of the subjects of the agreement 17 . On the other hand, American federalist tradition associated with the creation of the first contemporary federal state, has interpreted the agreement from a much more unitary-federal than confederal perspective. The centre of gravity is located in the governance of a "nation-state" (new processes of state-building and nation-building), and in the subsequent supremacy of the central power over the federated units. Here, the Union is more important than the units. It is obvious that different normative and institutional conclusions will be obtained depending on which of these two traditions of federalism is adopted (questions about liberty: individual and collective, positive and negative; about equality: the equality of national entities? the equality of federated units?, etc., and how these responses interrelate) 18 .
13) The political accommodation of minority nations through rules and federal procedures will, in general terms, require both the institutional concretion of the 2. The case of national pluralism in the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías".
The Spanish Constitution established two routes to achieve self-government -a quicker route (Art. 151) and a slower route (Art. 143) -depending on whether the "communities" had already possessed some form of political autonomy in earlier historical periods (the Second Republic: 1931 -1939 . In this way a kind of transitory asymmetry was established before the autonomous communities (hereafter referred to as AC) could achieve the highest level of self-government. However, the final division of powers was of a potentially symmetrical design provided that the AC which would achieve political autonomy by the slower route expressed a wish (as was expected and did in fact become a reality from the 1990s onwards) to have a greater degree of selfgovernment. The exception are the so-called "differentiating factors": a heterogeneous set of issues not necessarily related to the plurinational nature of the state, each one of which requires specific treatment (languages, insularity, special civil laws, etc). On the other hand, the most asymmetrical legal characteristic of the system is the economic agreement between the Basque Country and Navarre and the central government and which is regulated by the so-called "historical rights of the 'fuero' communities" (1 st additional clause of the Constitution).
2.1) The phases of constitutional development
It is possible to identify five different phases in the practical development of Spain's "Estado de las Autonomías" which have occurred between 1978 and 2008:
1) Constituent phase (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . This phase was characterized by the negotiation of the text of the constitution and the "statutes of the autonomous communities"
and was led by minority governments of the UCD 21 . These statutes were passed in a relatively short period of time: four years. The first to be passed were the Basque and Catalan statutes (both were passed by a large majority in 1979). In this phase, neither the political decentralization model nor the articulation of the plurinationality of the state were expressed through a "constitutional solution".
This was because neither of these issues had been resolved during the period of political transition (it should be borne in mind that one of the features of this period was the latent threat of coups d'état by the armed forces, which still had strong links with the Spanish Civil War and Franco's regime, a threat that finally became reality in the attempted coup d'état of February 1981). The result of this phase can be described as a procedural framework for the political decentralization that would take place in later legislative periods and would undergo a number of developments based on the principles of unity, autonomy and solidarity. These developments were conditioned by the large number of political autonomies that are neither named nor specifically defined in the Constitution and which differ significantly in national, demographic, cultural, economic and geographical terms. This agreement resulted in an increase in Catalonia's income, but without changing the previous model. In other words, it neither removed Catalonia from the common regime nor brought it closer to the "asymmetrical" regime of Navarre and the Basque Country.
Bilaterality was not accepted. In order to further reduce Catalonia's financial deficit (the official figures of which are unknown because the state has always refused to make them public, but which according to figures supplied by the Catalan administration and several studies is between 7% and 10% of Catalonia's GDP, a very high figure in comparative political terms), over the next seven years the state promises to invest a similar amount of money to that which Catalonia contributes to the Spanish GDP (18.5%). However, it fails to establish a system by which this figure will be calculated (Catalonia only received between 11% and 12% of state investment up until 2006). In the future, it is anticipated that inter-territorial "solidarity" should not change the income ranking of the AC. This is an issue which politicizes any potential technical calculation formulas, although some of the indicators used will be changed. For example, territorial criteria such as the cost of living and immigration will be taken into account, but these will be compensated by other criteria that will have the opposite effect. It would therefore appear that the new Statute fails to represent any sort of progress towards a proper system of fiscal federalism.
With regard to national recognition, the definition of Catalonia as a nation was removed from the articles of the Statute. In the preamble, which has no strict juridical value, it is stated that the Catalan Parliament "has defined Catalonia as a nation by a wide majority", but goes on to say that the Constitution recognizes the national reality of Catalonia as a "nationality". Finally, the Catalan flag, day and anthem are described as "national" in the new text while, on the other hand, the PSOE and the PP removed all reference to the "national" sports teams of Catalonia from the text.
Furthermore, a number of cuts were made in the powers of self-government with respect to those proposed in the Catalan Parliament's bill (e.g. with regard to immigration), although the perspective of a detailed breakdown of each power with a view to obtaining in principle, although this must be proven in practice, a greater degree of juridical protection in relation to conflicts that are referred to the Constitutional Court.
This will hinder the expansive policies carried out in past decades by the central government through a variety of legislative techniques (base laws, organic laws, etc).
Judicial power in Catalonia is regulated through a policy of decentralization of state institutions, thus reinforcing the position of the Catalan High Court. However, it will continue to be unnecessary for judges in Catalonia to know the Catalan language in order to obtain their posts: credit will be given for knowing the Catalan language, but it will not be a requirement. The chapter concerning European and foreign policy was also watered down. Somewhat unclearly, it is stated that Catalonia will be represented in the UNESCO.
In short, of the three basic aspects which motivated the reform of the Statute (national recognition, increase and protection of self-government and the finance system), the first is included in the preamble ( 
Concluding remarks
In this article, I have focused on some key concepts and values displayed by traditional liberal-democratic theories in plurinational contexts. Actually, these concepts and values were developed for societies that were much simpler than those that exist today.
Some of those theories include the emancipating "light", but also the uniformizing "shadows", associated with the modern process of the Enlightenment and an (at least implicit) acceptance of the processes of state nation-building in democratic liberalism. 2) The explicit recognition of Catalonia as a distinct national entity is established only in the Preamble of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy (which lacks strict normative power) and is further watered down in the articles by the word "nationality", a term which has been imitated by other regional autonomous communities in their own statutes (regardless their national characteristics) (2, 3 and 11).
3) The Spanish state has failed to embrace its internal linguistic plurality.
Languages other than Spanish are used only in the territories in which they are co-official. They are absent from the symbols and institutions of the state has evolved towards a symmetrical territorial model in institutional terms (7, 8, 9, 10, and 12) . Few opportunities for Catalonia to implement a foreign policy that would allow it to progress towards its recognition and accommodation at the international level (in contrast to the foreign policies of Quebec, the Swiss cantons or the Belgian regions-communities). Broadly speaking, there is a lack of accommodation of the different nation-building processes in this plurinational democracy (11, 13 and 14) .
6) The finance system of the AC. It is the central government that controls the economic resources (with the exception of the almost confederal cases of the Basque Country and Navarre). In Catalonia's case, the fiscal deficit appears to be between 7% and 10% of GDP (we use the word "appears" because successive central governments have refused to publish the official figures of the territorial balance sheets). This is highly unfavourable in the comparative political terms of composite states and attempts have been made to correct it in the new Catalan Statute, although the concepts involved and the method of calculation have not been established. This is likely to be a source of conflict in the future regarding financing and state investment in Catalonia (10 and 11).
7) The lack of recognition and political accommodation of the minority nations within the Spanish state display an stateist bias and make it likely that the "agonistic" confrontation between the different national groups will continue in the coming years (1 to 14).
